Blog 7: Decentralization is not the problem

     In “Gin, Television, and Cognitive Surplus”, Shirky focuses on the cumulative surplus of the aggregate; in other words, what is it that people do with their free time? Free time during the 1700s or pre-industrial England was uncommon. Then, people had to work many hours. In addition, with a rapidly growing population and the hardships of industrialization, many people turned to alcohol as the opiate to their despondency.  Shirky makes the analogy that many people in the industrialized world have an abundance of free time but they watch a great deal of television with that free time in order to escape their unhappiness (1-4).  Shirky refers to the term scale on numerous occasions. Scale is the surplus that the aggregate has offered.  It also relates to the amount of time that individuals can give to the collective effort of the aggregate of information.

London Gin Craze Had Roots in Nascent Company 

     Shirky implies that people can use their cumulative surplus of time to produce a collective knowledge of data, for example, Wikipedia and Ushahidi. Wikipedia and Ushahidi alike make it possible for collective knowledge to disperse globally.  Hence, the cumulative surplus of time to create a collective knowledge of data creates limitless possibilities with regard to people’s creativity and in many cases, online interaction. Shirky quotes Jib Fowles in Why Viewers Watch, “Television viewing has come to displace principally (a) other diversions, (b) socializing, and  (c) sleep.” Shirky then asserts that a negative impact of watching too much television is that it reduces human contact, which is explored in the ideology of social surrogacy hypothesis (7). Unlike television the Internet connects more people together, especially the younger generations who are willing to use it to create and share information with other people globally (12- 14). Thus they spend less time watching television. That time is being replaced with individuals actively consuming and producing online.  Cheaper online tools make affordance for individuals to move away from being passive consumers to more active consumers and/or producers of the collective knowledge.

Boob tube  

     Like Shirky, James Surowiecki believes in the collective aggregate of the group or crowd. “Under the right circumstances, groups are remarkably intelligent, and are often smarter than the smartest people in them” (XIII).   Surowiecki identifies three negative attributes of the collective intelligence: cognitive problems, coordination problem, and cooperation problem. First, cognitive problems have a specific result. Second, the coordination problem calls for the group to understand that each member will be doing the same thing. Third, the cooperation problem calls for the group to work together to achieve the same goal despite their biases (XVII).  Surowiecki asserts that these problems are no match for the collective intelligence. However, they must consider the extremes of the collective behavior (XIX).

     

     Surowiecki states, “Diversity and independence are important because the best collective decisions are the product of disagreement and contest, not consensus or compromise.”  With regards to Surowiecki’s collective intelligence theory, the CIA and the FBI aggregate of information on potential terrorist threat against America could have alerted the respective correspondents of a potential threat, regardless if they could have averted an attacked on American soil.   Surowiecki deliberates over this issue as to whether or not decentralization is a factor.  The CIA and the FBI are independent of each other though they serve the same interest, which is to protect American citizens. Surowiecki argues Friedrich Hayek’s, tacit knowledge as being a fourth problem to the collective intelligence, which is “knowledge that can’t be easily summarized or conveyed to others” (71). As a result of decentralization, there isn’t any guarantee that crucial and necessary information can be disseminated before that information becomes worthless to protect American citizens. Surowiecki acknowledges that there is a fourth problem but this could be addressed with making the aggregate of the local and private information into a collective whole like Google (72). This may seem easier said than done.   Finding the right balance that Surowiecki alludes to between individual knowledge globally and the collective aggregate could compromise safety if it is not between the specific and local (72). This implies that the cooperation problem between the CIA and FBI may seem more profound.  

     Another concept that Surowiecki discusses is the decentralization concept.  This system worked for Linux because it made affordances for diversity (73).  In other words, there isn’t a group of paid programmers who work to rectify technical issues on Linux.  This is a brilliant idea. Linux makes affordances for anyone to contribute to Linux programs globally. Surowiecki believes in the collective group’s aggregate. Therefore, remedying a “bug” related problem can be fix by any computer programmer globally; as long as that individual is willing to make time to rectify computer bugs (74).  In most cases it seems that these issues are remedied, thus supporting Shirky’s point of view that the scale of the collective aggregate is of great importance.

     James Surowiecki like Shirky believes in the collective aggregate of the group or crowd. “Under the right circumstances, groups are remarkably intelligent, and are often smarter than the smartest people in them” (XIII).   Surowiecki identifies three negative attributes of the collective intelligence cognitive problems, coordination problem and cooperation problem. First, cognitive problems have a specific result. Second, coordination problem calls for the group to understand that each member will be doing the same thing. Third, the cooperation problem calls for the group to work together to achieve the same goal despite of their biases (XVII).  Surowiecki asserts that these problems are no match for the collective intelligence. However, they must consider the extremes of the collective behavior (XIX).

     Surowiecki states, “Diversity and independence are important because the best collective decisions are the product of disagreement and contest, not consensus or compromise.”  With regards to Surowiecki’s collective intelligence theory, the CIA and the FBI aggregate of information on potential theorists treat on America could have alerted the respective correspondents of a potential treat, regardless if they could have avert an attacked.   Surowiecki deliberates over this issue as to weather or not decentralization is a factor.   The CIA and the FBI are independent of each other though they serve the same interest, which is, to protect American citizens. Surowiecki argues Friedrich Hayek’s, tacit knowledge as being a fourth problem to the collective intelligence, which is “knowledge that can’t be easily summarized or conveyed to others” (71). As a result of decentralization, there isn’t any guarantee that crucial and necessary information can be disseminated before that information becomes worthless to protect American citizens per se. Surowiecki acknowledges that there is a fourth problem but this could be addressed with a making the aggregate of the local and private information into a collective whole like Google (72). This may seem easier said than done.   Finding the right balance that Surowiecki alludes to between individual knowledge globally and the collective aggregate could compromise safety if it’s not between the specific and local (72). This implies that the cooperation problem between the CIA and FBI may seem more profound. 

     Another concept that Surowiecki discusses is the decentralization concepts.  This system worked for Linux because it made affordances for diversity (73).  In other words, there isn’t a group of payed programmers who work to rectify technical issues on Linux.  This is a brilliant idea. Linux makes affordances for anyone globally to contribute to Linux programs. Surowiecki believes in the collective group’s aggregate. Therefore, remedying a “bug” related problem can done so by any will be a programmer globally who is willing to give time to fixing the this issue (74).  In most cases, it seems that these issues are remedied. Thus, supporting Shirky’s point of view that the scale of the collective aggregate is of great importance.

     Surowiecki flip flops on his explanation of decentralization and its impact with the CIA and the FBI inability to thwart terrorist attacks on America. He states that the agencies are decentralized, which is crucial to independence and diversity. However, their aggregate of judgment of information was lacking. Surowiecki asserts that if these agencies had a chance to combine their computer databases then they stand a chance of evaluating the facts, which would eventually lead to them creating plausible theories of terrorist attacks.  Thus, they may even be able to predict the potential people who threaten the safety of America’s citizens.

     In conclusion, it may seem that a larger number of people, especially the younger generation may be more into producing more and consuming more online than the older generation. As to whether or not the older generation is spending more time watching television is yet to be proven. The fact is there is a cognitive surplus and organizations like Linux are making affordances for many people to become more than just consumers but also producers.